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    Abstract – Smartphone technology is more and more 
becoming the predominant communication tool for 
people across the world. People use their smartphones 
to keep their contact data, to browse the internet, to 
exchange messages, to keep notes, carry their personal 
files and documents, etc. Users while browsing are also 
capable of shopping online, thus provoking a need to 
type their credit card numbers and security codes. As 
the smartphones are becoming widespread so do the 
security threats and vulnerabilities facing this 
technology. Recent news and articles indicate huge 
increase in malware and viruses for operating systems 
employed on smartphones (primarily Android and 
iOS). Major limitations of smartphone technology are 
its processing power and its scarce energy source since 
smartphones rely on battery usage. Since smartphones 
are devices which change their network location as the 
user moves between different places, intrusion 
detection systems for smartphone technology are most 
often classified as IDSs designed for mobile ad-hoc 
networks. The aim of this research is to give a brief 
overview of IDS technology, give an overview of major 
machine learning and pattern recognition algorithms 
used in IDS technologies, give an overview of security 
models of iOS and Android and propose a new host-
based IDS model for smartphones and create proof-of-
concept application for Android platform for the newly 
proposed model. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    Smartphone’s operate in so called mobile ad-hoc 
networks or MANETS. Unlike to the infrastructure 
architecture, wireless ad hoc networks consist of group of 
mobile nodes or peers which are capable of 
communicating with each other without a physical access 
point. Topology of ad-hoc network is dynamic and is 
designed as a random graph. Other important aspects 
include the spacing of the nodes and their self-organizing 
abilities. Wireless medium is used to transmit data 
between different stations. Several different physical 
layers of architecture are defined to support the wireless 
medium access for mobile ad hoc networks to operate 
efficiently. MANETS are basically a system of mobile 
nodes where the communication between nodes is 
realized via wireless links. Due to mobility of nodes the 
topology of MANETs is often changing. Due to their 
inherent vulnerabilities, such as resource constrains, 
uncontrollable environment, and dynamic network 
topology, wireless ad hoc networks are subject to a 
variety of attacks [1]. 
    Major problem with the intrusion detection systems 
that were developed for mobile-ware computer 
technologies is a problem of CPU and memory and their 
consumption, because smartphones and other mobile 
devices have limited energy resources. The other major 
problem is that most other protection systems such as 
antivirus need to continually update their virus signatures 
from the central repository and since updating of phone 
antivirus signatures is energy-expensive it is more likely 
that the attackers may try to use newer kinds of attacks to 
compromise smartphones.  
    Dikinson states that the antivirus companies take time 
to update their signature repositories, and when the new 
kind of malware is created and placed onto the network, 
hackers have substantial amount of time to perform their 
attacks before malware signatures are updated across 
different machines [2]. 
    Other problem is that since there are many kinds of 
machines certain attacks can target specific kinds of 
operating systems and machines which might not be a 
priority for certain antivirus and security companies that 
serve updates to their customers. Often, smartphones fall 
into this category. Because of all these problems there is a 
need for more general approach to solving these issues. 
One of the major ways this can be achieved is by 
utilization of machine learning and design pattern 
algorithms, use of mathematical and statistical models 
which when applied are capable of detecting the malware 
which isn’t discovered previously and which doesn’t have 
to be within the repositories of the known malware. 
    The majority of work that deals with mobile IDS 
systems deals with host based IDS in which methods of 
anomaly or rule-based are utilized and used to extract and 
perform analysis of the features and then make decisions 
on the state of the device. The extraction is done locally 
and the analysis is done either locally or on a remote 
server.  
    Any smartphone IDS that would require high amount 
of computation on the device would lower the user 
experience, consume power resources, so the IDS that 
would truly be functional and protective for the user is 
extremely challenging to design and would have to be 
done on as lowest level OS as possible, carefully 
programming for evasion of memory leaks, etc. 
 
II. ANDROID SECURITY OVERVIEW 
 
    The following Android security overview is primarily 
based on official Android documentation.1 
    The main building blocks of Android device are 
Android hardware, Android operating system, and 
Android application runtime. The Android runs on all 
kinds of different hardware configurations. These include 
smartphones, tablets, set-up boxes. 
    The Android operating system is composed of the core 
which is build on top of Linux kernel. All the resources of 
the Android such as camera function, GPS-data, blue-
tooth functions, telephony functions, network 
connections, are all accessed through the operating 
system.  
    The Android application runtime is created in Java 
programming language and is run in Dalvik virtual 
machine. However, many applications as well as Android 
core services and applications are native applications or 
integrate native libraries. 
    Dalvik as well as native applications all run inside of 
the same security environment which is contained within 
the applications sandbox. Every application has its own 
part of the file system where its private data including 
database and files can be written. The Android 
applications extend the Android core operating system 
and two main sources for applications are pre-installed 
applications and user-installed applications. Pre-installed 
applications include apps such as phone, email, calendar, 
browser and contacts. These are the key device 
capabilities and are available to the user as well as other 
applications. Pre-installed applications can also be 
developed by OEM-specific device.  
    The user installed applications are the third-party 
applications created by other developers. The Google Play 
Android web store contains hundreds of thousands of 
applications. Google also provides number of cloud-base 
services which can be accessed through the Android 
device.  
    Android provides the following key security features: 
1) Robust Security at the OS level  
2) Mandatory application sandbox for all 
applications.  
                                                          
1 Official Android documentation: 
http://source.android.com/tech/security/index.html 
3) Secure interpose communication 
4) Application signing 
5) Application defined and user granted 
permissions 
    At the level of the operating system the Android 
platform provides the security of the Linux kernel as well 
as secure process communication (IPC) facility which 
enables secure communication between applications 
running in different processes. Application send-box 
constraints even the native code. This ensures that if 
malicious application happens to get installed on the 
system it will be prevented from harming the system itself 
and harming other applications.  
    The Linux provides the Android with the following 
security features: 
1) User based permission model 
2) Process-based isolation 
3) Extensible mechanism for secure IPC 
4) The ability to remove potentially unsecure part 
of the kernel. 
    Each application which is installed on the Android OS 
behaves as a unique user. The Android assigns each user 
application unique ID and runs it as a separate user in a 
separate process.  
    The app signing enables the users to uniquely identify 
the author of the application and gives them ability to 
update their application without having to cope with 
complicated interfaces and permissions. When the 
developer creates the application he has to sign it. If there 
is an attempt to install an unsigned application the Google 
Play store will reject it as well as the packages installed 
on the Android device. This creates the mutual trust 
between the Google and the developer. The application 
can uniquely be identified and its developer and the 
developers can be accountable for the behaviour of their 
applications and developers can be assure that the 
application which is being sold or installed on users 
devices is really theirs. 
    Application signing is the first step in placing the 
application in application sandbox. The different 
applications run under different user IDs and the signed 
user certificate defines which user’s id is associated with 
which application. The app signing makes sure that one 
application cannot access any other application except 
through well defined IPC.  
    Upon the installation of the APK file the package 
manager checks the APK for proper signature, and for the 
proper signing of the app included in the APK. If the 
certificate matches the key used to sign any other APK on 
the device the the APK has the option to specify in its 
manifest that it will share UID with the similarly signed 
APKs. The application can be signed by the third party or 
can be self-signed. The developers can generate a self-
signing certificate without external assistance or 
permission (and this is the main difference with Apple’s 
iOS). The applications do not have to be signed by the 
central authority (iOS applications do). The central 
authority verification is currently not mandatory for 
Android operating system.  
 
III. IOS SECURITY OVERVIEW 
 
The iOS Security overview is primarily based on official 
Apple documentation.2 
    The iOS architecture at the highest level acts as an 
intermediary between and underlying hardware and the 
applications that appear on the screen. The apps that 
developer creates rarely talk directly to the underlying 
hardware. The interface between the application and the 
hardware are the system interfaces which protect the 
hardware from changes by the application.  
    This also makes it possible to easily create apps which 
work consistently on devices with different hardware 
capabilities. 
    The implementation of iOS technologies can be viewed 
as a set of layers which are shown in Figure 13, layers of 
iOS. The lowest layer is the system and it contains the 
most fundamental services and technologies upon which 
applications rely. 
    More sophisticated services and technologies are 
placed on higher layers. Even though the lower layer 
frameworks are available to the developers, developers 
should mostly stick with the higher level frameworks. 
    Besides having a built in security framework iOS also 
gives an option to use an explicit security framework, 
security dot framework that can be utilize to guarantee the 
security of the data application manages. This framework 
provides interfaces for managing certificates, public and 
private keys and trust policies. It includes the generation 
of cryptographically secured pseudorandom numbers. It 
also supports the storage of certificates and cryptographic 
keys in the keychain which is as we previously mentioned 
secure repository for user data. The common crypto 
library provides additional support for symmetric 
encryption HMAC, and digests. The digests feature 
provides functions that are essentially compatible with 
those in the OpenSSL library, which is not available in 
iOS. 
    J. Zdziarski states that iOS operating system 
incorporates four layers of security for its users and their 
data protection and these include [3] : 
1) Device Security – methods/techniques to protect 
the device from unauthorized usage; 
2) Data Security – methods/techniques to protect 
data on the device, even in case when device is 
stolen; 
3) Network Security – encryption techniques used 
to encrypt data that is being sent over a network 
                                                          
2 Official Apple documentation: 
http://developer.apple.com/library/ios/#documentation 
4) Applications security – methods/techniques used 
to secure operating system and isolate individual 
applications while they are running.  
    iOS puts each application in a sandbox at the install 
time and this includes its preference and its data. A 
sandbox is a set of fine-grained controls which limit the 
apps access to resources of other applications such as  
files, preferences, network resources, hardware and etc. 
Upon its installation an application receives its own 
sandbox directory which serves as a home for the app and 
its data.  
    The main function of the sandbox model is to prevent 
malicious application from damaging other applications 
and their data. This means that application itself which 
does contain code which can result in a security breach 
may result in a damage of only that specific application. 
The sandbox prevents the hijacked app from affecting 
other applications and other parts of the system. This 
approach considers an environment in which the code is 
understood not to be trusted by default and is because of 
that isolated from processes and resources available to the 
operating systems. The apples Sandbox limits the number 
of CPU cycles an application can use as well as the 
amount of memory application can use. It also restricts 
apps from accessing files from outside its dedicated home 
directory.  
    Classes for interfacing with the camera, GPS and other 
resources on the devices are provided by the Apple, and 
restrictions are placed on applications from accessing 
many of the components directly. Besides this the binary 
code which is running on the device must be signed by 
Apple’s central authority and this was incorporated by the 
Apple into its security model from the beginning.  
    Apple signs the application and this is the only way an 
application is permitted to run under the iOS. The reason 
for this is to make sure the applications haven’t been 
modified from their original binary. The Apple also tests 
the integrity of an application in order to check whether 
there was unsigned code injected into the application. 
Another part of application security incorporated into 
Apples devices is the encrypted key-chain which provides 
central facility for storage and retrieval of network 
passwords, networking credentials and other information. 
The Apples security framework facilitates low level 
functionality for reading and writing the data to and from 
the keychain and performing encryption and decryption. 
The data within the key-chain is logically zoned so that 
the application cannot access the encrypted data stored by 
different applications[3]. Apple’s Common Crypto 
architecture provides cryptographic APIs to the 
developers who would like to make use of encryption in 
their applications. 
 
IV. IDS ON SMARTPHONES  – RELATED 
WORK 
 
     Samfat and Molva propose architecture for mobile 
networks - IDAMN and they use anomaly detection 
methods as well as rule-based methods. There are three 
levels of detection; Location based detection (user located 
at two different locations at the same time), traffic 
anomaly detection (extremely low or extremely high 
levels network traffic), and the detection of anomalous 
behaviour of specific mobile phone user[4]. 
    Artificial neural networks were utilized in order to 
detect anomalous behaviour of fraud in the usage of 
operator services, for example registration with the false 
identity and using the phone to hide tariff destinations. 16 
distinct features representing standard mean deviation of 
the total duration and number of long and short term 
national and international calls were used for this kind of 
detection [5]. 
    A collaborative proxy-based system for smartphones 
called Smartsiren was presented by Cheng and others[6].  
By analyzing of communication activities of the 
smartphones they tried to detect abnormal behaviours on a 
single device as well as system-wide. Smartsiren is 
composed of backend proxy that communicates with 
light-weight agents on the protected devices. The 
information is collected and then sent to the proxy who 
then uses this to analyze it and if abnormal behaviour is 
detected the alert is sent. 
    Schmidt et all utilize a Symbian monitoring client for 
the smartphone based on Symbian OS, which collects and 
forwards collected features to anomaly detection server 
RADS[7]. This data is then processed in order to 
distinguish between normal and abnormal behaviour. The 
results show that top applications used by phone users 
modify and affect the monitored features in various ways. 
Intrusion detection systems that detect attacks which 
deplete the devices energy and basically reduce the 
quality of service to the user were analyzed by several 
papers [8], [9].  
    Another study demonstrates a malware detection 
framework which tracks and analyzes and detects threats 
which affect power supply and energy of the device. The 
frameworks main activities surround sampling of power 
consumption by the applications generating power 
signatures which are then used to detect malware by 
measuring how similar are these power signatures and 
using χ2 distance measure. Basic experiments applied to 
HP iPAQ device which has a windows mobile OS on it, 
showed 99% of classifying mobile malware [10]. 
    Battery sensing intrusion detection system (B-SIPS) for 
mobile devices was developed by Buennemeyer et al. It 
deals with detecting abnormal current changes. B-SIPS 
relies on the SNORT IDS which provides a signature 
based detection of attack [11]. 
    One study used linear regression model to estimate 
power consumption, and the model is based on 
parameters CPU-Load and disc access and its main 
objective is to determine the amount of energy used on a 
per-process basis and to allocate or find processes that 
could possibly exhaust the energy source [12]. 
    Jacoby and Davis demonstrate IDS B-BID whose 
primary focus is detecting the attacks on battery source. 
This IDS monitors the devices electrical current and 
evaluates the correlation with the known signatures and 
patterns. In order to detect attacks the electrical current is 
measured and if the anomaly is detected all kinds of data 
such as network activity, CPU usage process count is 
collected and tested against known attack signatures. 
Additional feature is to send this data to the network 
administrator [13]. 
    Miettinen presented a hybrid host-and-network based 
IDS, because of the claim that alone, these system are not 
sufficient, the engine on the server filters the received 
alarms according to correlation rules stored in the 
knowledge base and sends the results to the security 
monitoring GUI for the administrator to analyze [14]. 
    Hwang evaluated the effectiveness of keystroke 
dynamics-based authentication (KDA) on mobile devices. 
Their empirical evaluation focuses on a short four digit 
pin numbers and the results show only 4% of false alert 
rate [15]. 
    The most recent research on this topic is the KBTA 
framework[16]. A new kind of host-based IDS for 
smartphones is proposed in which detection is achieved 
by continual monitoring of mobile device and looking for 
malicious temporal behaviour. The framework itself relies 
on a lightweight agent in terms of CPU, memory and 
power consumption. This agent continuously samples 
different features on the device, performs the analysis of 
the gathered data and then infers the state of the device. 
The reason why this approach is unique is because of the 
use of temporal framework which utilizes the behavioural 
patterns registered over time. This is then used to discover 
previously unknown malware based on these patterns.  
    This framework also requires that the interpretation of 
the gathered data should be context sensitive and that it 
should be analyzed within given context rather then pure 
classification based on signature or methods that were 
used in previous work.   
    Oher major IDS proposed is Andromaly [17]. It is host-
based and it continually monitors various features and 
events obtained from mobile device and then applies 
machine learning anomaly detectors to classify the 
collected data as normal-benign, or abnormal-malicious.  
    The classifiers that were examined include k-means, 
logistic regression, histograms, decision trees, Bayesian 
networks, naive Bayes. The evaluation is typically split 
into two phases – training and testing. In the first phase a 
training set of benign and malicious features is provided 
to the system in a form of feature vector. These features 
are both collected during normal operations of the system, 
reflecting benign behaviour and when malware is active 
on the system, thus providing vectors for malicious 
behaviours in order for the classifier to be properly 
trained.  
    One other major approach proposed is cloud-based IDS 
for smartphones[18]. It consists of a cloud-based service 
which would allow users to install a light-weight agent on 
their smartphones and register to an online cloud-service 
by specifying their operating system, applications 
installed on their phone and other relevant information 
about their device. Afterwards, this specific smartphone is 
emulated in a virtual machine on the cloud using a proxy 
which duplicates the incoming traffic to the device and 
then forwards the traffic to the emulation platform, where 
detection and forensic analysis is preformed. 
 
PROPOSED MODEL - AMOXID 
 
    This model proposes categorization of threats into three 
main categories: 1 – Threats to user’s experience; 2 – 
Cost generating threats; 3 – Privacy infringing threats. 
    Threats to user's experience revolve around user’s 
general experience and enjoyment while using the 
smartphone and they include: 
a) Malware that drains the battery will decrease the 
smartphone live-time and will necessitate often 
recharging which will become burdensome on 
the user.  
b) Malware which attacks and eats up memory will 
slow down the speed and responsiveness of the 
applications and the user experience will suffer. 
    Threats that generate cost include: 
a) Outgoing phone calls (within user's telephone 
network, in roaming mode, long distance calls) 
b) Outgoing SMS messages 
c) Unauthorized connection to GPRS internet while 
the user is in the roaming mode or while the user 
is in a foreign country, all of which can generate 
extremely large costs. Our model primarily 
focuses on this kind threats and extractions of 
feature that are related to generating of cost. 
d) Other cost that can be generated is in case of 
online shopping where user’s credit card data is 
compromised, which is then used or sold on a 
black market causing financial damage to the 
user. This overlaps with privacy infringing 
threats. 
    Privacy infringing threats include the following: 
a) Logging of keystrokes.  
b) Recording user’s voice conversations;  
c) Copying users documents such as images and 
text notes; 
d) Logging and copying SMS messages, phone call 
logs, user's phone book; 
e) Watching user’s activity on the internet, such as 
which websites he is visiting, his accounts 
passwords and other Internet activity; 
f) Tracking users Geo-location and user movement 
(GPS); 
    The above categories can be analyzed separately and 
dealt with as three different subsystems in the IDS for 
smarpthones. 
 
AmoxID - Network policies and conceptual model  
    Smartphone is a device to be carried as user moves 
between different locations. When moving between 
different locations user enters different types of network. 
At home he uses his own wireless network within his 
household. At work user is within his company’s network. 
On the outside user connects to outside networks. 
Different networks have different threats lurking around 
and some networks have Network IDS employed (such as 
company’s network). Users of smartphones are 
sometimes given smartphones by their companies which 
require them to follow policies and which additionally 
need to protect their employee’s phones, because not 
protecting their employees would mean not protecting 
companies data. We introduce the concept of setting 
different policies and IDS operating with different levels 
of alertness depending upon which network is user 
connected to. 
    This paper has primary goal of giving a conceptual 
model of possible IDS designed for mobile devices. The 
results achieved on the chosen vector parameters for the 
SVM could only be valid if tested on different 
smartphone devices running same operating system with 
different processing and memory power. Multi-core 
systems, GB-RAM memories are available only to an 
expensive palette of phones so the performance of the 
IDS on these systems would produce better results and 
higher accuracy of classification. All of these will be left 
for future work and will be tested in future papers and 
work on this issue. 
    The proof of concept IDS proposed and developed for 
Android is named AmoxID. The conceptual model is 
given in Figure 1. 
    This model proposes system of policies where 
depending on the user’s current network, different policy 
level is applied and detection mechanism is on higher 
alert in public networks, while home and work networks 
are to be considered safer and there is a possibility of 
integration with Network IDS of the company or IDS that 
user sets up at his own household network. 
    This can be of importance to companies who are 
issuing phones to their employees. If company sends 
confidential emails and gives confidential data to 
employees that are accessing this through the smartphone, 
it is important that this information stays protected. 
Specially designed policies for employee’s smartphones 
that are issued to employees can be configured to include 
pre-built IDS which would enforce different policies 
depending on the user’s current network. If the user 
happens to be outside of company’s network, different 
policies are applied which protect access to company’s 
data on the phone. When inside the company’s network, 
the installed IDS could be maintained by the network 
administrator. IDS would interact with IDS on the server 
such as SNORT which could then utilize higher 
processing and memory power to analyze logs on the 
employee’s smartphone. All of this can also be designed 
in a way not to diminish users overal experience and 
without much effort on the user's side.  
    Other thing that should be taken into consideration is 
the fact that there is higher chance for power source of the 
user's smartphone being available when the user is within 
his home or work environment. 
    This paper proposes three types of policies to be 
enforced depending on te users current network.  
1.Home Network, 2.Work Network, 3.Public Network 
(inside of user’s telephone network provider or outside) 
 
    Features that could are tracked and based on which we 
create vectors for SVM in this version of AmoxID IDS 
are as follows: 
1) 1.call_ntinlst_inn: Number of outgoing calls 
toward numbers outside contact list within user’s 
telephone network provider.  
2) 2.call_ntinlst_outn: Number of outgoing calls 
toward numbers outside contact list outside 
user’s telephone network provider. 
3) 3.call_inlst_inn: number of outgoing calls 
toward numbers that are inside of contact list 
inside user’s telephone network provider. 
4) 4.call_inlst_outn: Number of outgoing calls 
towards numbers that are inside of contact list 
outside user’s telephone network provider. 
5) 5.sms_ntinlst_inn: Number of SMS going 
towards numbers outside of contact list within 
user’s telephone network provider. 
6) 6.sms_ntinlst_outn: Number of SMS going 
towards numbers outside of contact list outside 
user’s telephone network provider. 
7) 7.sms_inlst_inn: Number of SMS going towards 
numbers inside of contact list within user’s 
telephone network provider. 
Figure 1: AmoxID – Conceptual Model 
8) 8.sms_inlst_outn: Number of SMS going 
towards numbers inside of contact list outside 
user’s telephone network provider. 
9) 9.gprs_inn: Connection to GPRS within user’s 
telephone network provider. 
10) 10.gprs_outn: Connection to GPRS outside 
user’s telephone network provider. 
 
The screenshots of AmoxID application developed for 
this purpose are given below: 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
    This paper has given a brief overview of Intrusion 
Detection Systems used in various contexts of computer 
devices security with special focus on smartphones. We 
have proposed a model based on SVM classification and 
proposed enforcement of different policies based on the 
type of Network the user happens to connect to. We have 
categorized threats on mobile devices into three major 
categories which can be addressed separately. These 
include 1 - user-experience threats, 2 - cost generating 
threats, 3 – privacy-infringing threats. 
    The future work will involve thorough testing of 
AmoxID on different devices with Android operating 
system and consequent results will be published in 
relevant academic literature. 
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